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REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN ENGLAND: A CHANGING 
ROLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S REGIONAL OFFICES? 
TO BE CITED: Pearce, G., Mawson, J. and Ayres, S. (2008) ‘Regional 
governance in England: A changing role for the Government’s Regional 
Offices?’ Public Administration, 86, 2, 443-463. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: Political devolution has transformed constitutional arrangements in the Celtic 
nations. By contrast, in the English regions a less radical approach has been adopted, but 
the outcome has been a strengthening of the institutions of regional governance. A key 
feature has been the enhanced responsibilities of the Government’s Offices for the 
Regions, which have been encouraged to build on their traditional administrative 
functions and adopt a more strategic role. This article explores the Offices’ contribution 
to regional and local governance. Our central argument is that although increasingly 
expected to act as a bridgehead between national and sub-national government and a 
focus for regional policy coordination, their potential role in filling the missing gap in 
English regional governance has not yet been fully grasped.  
INTRODUCTION 
Recent devolution settlements in the Celtic nations signify a radical shift in 
constitutional arrangements. By contrast, government reforms in the nine English 
regions have been more modest. During New Labour’s first term the Government 
established Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) to act as catalysts for economic 
development, while Whitehall’s representatives in the regions, the Government Offices 
for the Regions (GOs), were charged with administering policies on behalf of an 
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increasing number of Whitehall departments. In London which, in reality, is a city with 
a distinctive identity rather than a region, the abolition of the Greater London Council in 
1986 left a vacuum and over time exposed a renewed need for policy coordination 
(Travers 2002). In response, the Greater London Authority (GLA), comprising an elected 
Assembly and Mayor, was established in 2000 with ‘strategic’ powers, including 
economic development, policing and emergency services and transport. Nonetheless, in 
terms of public administration, London retained its regional status including its own 
GO, RDA and the branch offices of government executive agencies. Beyond the Capital, 
demand for elected regional government appeared lukewarm and reliance was placed 
on eight indirectly nominated Regional Assemblies (RAs), comprising local authority 
councillors and representatives of regional business and community interests. They 
were to be a stopgap in advance of elected assemblies and have become responsible for 
championing regional interests, preparing statutory Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs), 
scrutinizing the RDAs’ activities and coordinating a wide range of regional strategies.   
The 2002 White Paper, Your Region, Your Choice offered the prospect of elected bodies in 
regions outside London, subject to public support expressed in regional referendums 
(Cabinet Office and DTLR 2002). They would possess a limited range of functions, 
largely drawn down from central government bodies such as the GOs and other public 
bodies operating in the regions. Nonetheless, support for regional government in central 
and local government and among the wider public was at best tentative and the first 
referendum held in North East England in November 2004 delivered a crushing ‘no’ 
vote. It left the English regions, apart from London, with regional administration and as 
‘virtually the only regions in Europe which do not enjoy some form of regional 
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democracy or some form of regional representation’ (Cabinet Office and DTLR 2002, p. 
36). Despite this outcome, ‘the Government are committed to the development of fit-
for-purpose regional institutions and to continue their clear policy to devolve 
and decentralize power to regions, where this adds value’ (Cooper 2006). This is 
underpinned by the view that regional institutions bring a unique strategic perspective 
to policy development and investment decisions, that economic differences between 
regions demand different forms of policy intervention and that some issues, which cross 
local authority boundaries, require a coordinated response. Furthermore, regional 
institutions have demonstrated an increasing capacity for policymaking, which suggests 
that ‘bottom-up’ regionalism will continue to grow.  
While falling short of institutional reforms introduced elsewhere in the UK these 
developments can be viewed as evidence of a recalibration in the functions and 
relationships between and within territorial scales of government and the creation of a 
more protean, multi-tiered form of governance (Stirling 2005). Regional actors are 
increasingly expected to operate within flatter inter-organizational structures that cross 
public, private and community sector boundaries, opening the prospect of a more 
holistic approach to regional management (Rhodes et al 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; 
Rhodes 2000). Increasing weight is also being placed on boosting the vertical links 
between the centre and regional and local agencies and regional actors have been urged 
to develop and refine their governance capacity and co-operate to maximize their 
influence in Whitehall. Central departments, too, are increasingly expected to take 
account of the views of regional stakeholders in determining national policies and 
spending programmes (Flinders 2002). ‘The Government believes that when decisions 
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are taken with an awareness of regional priorities, they are likely to be better decisions 
and can allow more appropriate policy responses to be designed’ (HM Treasury 2004, p. 
3). Moreover, as part of Labour’s ambitious programme of ‘joined-up’ government, 
departments are being encouraged to adopt a more coordinated approach to policy 
issues with a regional dimension as a way of increasing the core executive’s capacity to 
negotiate the complex, inter-organizational issues around regional policy-making and 
implementation. A more circumspect view, however, is that English government has not 
been designed with decentralisation in mind and, far from being diminished, Whitehall 
has used its sizeable regional presence to enhance its control over decision-making and 
resources (Bache and Flinders 2004; Adams et al 2003). ‘Even when it [New Labour] 
appeals to networks to deliver services, it tends to focus on the techniques by which the 
central state might try to impose itself in order to define both patterns of behaviour and 
eventual outcomes’ (Bevir 2005, p. 10).  
This article explores these competing frameworks through an examination of the 
evolving roles and contributions of the Government’s Regional Offices. Their launch in 
1994 prompted a debate about ‘whether they were a means of more effectively focusing 
regional concerns to Whitehall, or whether they were a means of Whitehall more 
effectively controlling what happened in the regions’ (Roberts and Hart 1996, p. 11). 
Early observations suggested that the latter role prevailed (Bache 2000). More recently, 
however, the Government has signalled that GOs should play a more strategic role,  
‘working with local and regional partners to determine priorities and stretch 
performance, translating departmental policies into operational delivery, by 
providing focused policy and performance feedback to departments about regional 
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delivery challenges and solutions in delivering Public Service Agreements (PSAs) 
and supporting and challenging regional strategies to improve their quality and 
consistency’ (HM Treasury 2006, p. 143). 
We may, in effect, be witnessing efforts to realign the GOs’ functions. Nonetheless, 
important questions remain about whether these amount to a coherent package and 
whether the GOs have the capacity to meet these challenges.  
To examine these issues we draw on documentary evidence and some seventy semi-
structured interviews conducted with Whitehall civil servants responsible for regional 
affairs in each domestic department, GO and Regional Assembly Directors, RDA Chief 
Executives, other senior officials and representatives of business, community and 
voluntary sector interests in each region outside London. We were assisted in 
identifying and securing contacts with senior civil servants by the ODPM’s Regional and 
Local Government Research Unit. Interviews were conducted under Chatham House 
Rules to elucidate views on emerging roles and relationships and responses were 
analysed manually using coding techniques. We begin by briefly examining the 
evolution of GOs. Second, their formal roles, structures and resources are examined. 
Third, because the GOs’ effectiveness depends upon other actors operating at different 
territorial scales, we explore their relationships with Whitehall departments and their 
key regional and sub-regional partners. We conclude by reflecting on their achievements 
and the prospects of GOs developing a more regionally responsive role.   
THE EVOLVING ROLES OF GOVERNMENT REGIONAL OFFICES  
‘Integrated’ GOs were created in reaction to unease that regional public administration 
was too fragmented and as a compensating, coordination mechanism to an increasingly 
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federated civil service. Regional officials from the Departments of Employment, 
Environment, Transport and Trade and Industry were brought together under single 
Regional Directors, reporting to four Secretaries of State. Although intended to make 
Whitehall more responsive to sub-national stakeholders, early research indicated that 
civil servants retained their gate-keeping role and communication did not evolve into 
dialogue (Mawson and Spencer 1997). A Cabinet Office report, Reaching Out (2000), was 
highly critical of Whitehall’s ability to present a coherent picture of central policies at 
sub-national level. It observed that, compared with some other European countries 
including France, where the préfet represents the interests of all domestic state ministries 
and allows for the possibility of a greater degree of co-ordination in both départements 
and régions, in the English regions no single government official or body was responsible 
for integrating central government policies.  
Measures were deemed necessary to improve the co-ordination of national policy 
initiatives with a regional dimension, enhance understanding of regional issues in the 
design of national policies and ensure that government service delivery matched local 
circumstances. Reforms to the GOs’ management were also seen as essential to secure 
policy coordination. Critically there also remained significant areas of public policy with 
specific regional implications that lay outside the GOs’ remit and domestic departments 
not already collocated in the GOs were urged to do so. Furthermore, following a long 
line of initiatives aimed at fostering inter-departmental working in Whitehall (Kavanagh 
and Richards 2001; Hennessy et al 1997), crosscutting measures and joint departmental 
PSAs, including a regional dimension where appropriate, were introduced and 
departments were encouraged to create new or expand existing regional teams. An 
 7 
interdepartmental Regional Coordination Unit (RCU), initially attached to the Cabinet 
Office, but transferred to the new Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) in 2002, 
was also established. It would administer and monitor the GO network, provide a 
channel of communication between GOs and the centre, facilitate a more corporate 
approach to regional issues across departments and oversee and coordinate Area Based 
Initiatives (ABIs) (Regional Coordination Unit 2003). Furthermore, instead of being 
accountable to separate departments, GO Regional Directors would report corporately 
to the RCU’s Director General.  
Despite these measures, regional and local officials continued to struggle to integrate 
separate government initiatives dealing with the same problem or the same client group 
(Regional Coordination Unit 2002). Moreover, although more spending departments 
were drawn into regional working, Whitehall’s engagement in the GOs remains uneven. 
Apart from the small public health teams collocated in GOs, the Department of Health 
(DoH) has no regional operations. In 1998, a review of its executive agencies led the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to establish ‘Regional Cultural 
Consortiums’ and increase its GO presence, but staff numbers remain small. Similarly, 
the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and its predecessors largely bypassed 
the regional tier in favour of sub-regional Learning and Skills Council (LSC) offices and 
only in 2006 were the department’s GO-based activities fully integrated. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) also resisted establishing a GO presence until 
2001, by which time MAFF had been merged in a ministerial reshuffle into a new 
department, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). 
Although the Home Office had a presence in the GOs since 1994, this was limited to a 
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small number of staff responsible for crime reduction initiatives and targets and the 
Home Office funded Regional Voluntary Sector Networks. It was not until 2002 that the 
then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, was persuaded by the Deputy Prime Minister to 
integrate Home Office teams responsible for delivering crime reduction, drugs and civil 
renewal programmes into the GOs’ structures. The consequence of these variations is 
that departmental expectations about the Offices’ roles differ. While they contribute to 
the GOs’ administrative costs, some £150million annually, in proportion to their 
programme funding, each department retains control over frontline funds. Furthermore, 
staff are not employed by GOs, which have no legal status, but remain part of the 
administrative hierarchy of sponsor departments.  
The 2002 English Regions White Paper did not offer the radical and over-arching vision 
of future inter-governmental relations that some might have wished. While leaving the 
door ajar for elected regional government, it proposed extending the GOs’ 
responsibilities, giving central government a stronger, more far-reaching and better-
organised presence in the regions. GOs were judged ‘well placed to reflect the regional 
dimension on a wider range of policy areas’ and ‘better able to join up policies and 
programmes with related aims’ (Cabinet Office and DTLR 2002, p. 31). The White Paper 
gave the GOs a fuller role in coordinating the activities of central government agencies 
and non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) operating in the regions through 
‘Regional Boards’. GOs were also urged to promote a constructive dialogue with the 
Assemblies and given extra responsibilities to work with and monitor RDAs. Moreover, 
GOs were exhorted to broker local solutions, support local PSAs and neighbourhood 
renewal and inform Whitehall on implementation issues.  
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The Treasury has displayed growing interest in regional governance and Devolving 
Decision Making highlighted the importance of increasing local and regional flexibilities 
and introducing stronger accountability frameworks, as a way of modernising service 
delivery and cultivating economic growth in less favoured regions (HM Treasury and 
Cabinet Office 2004; HM Treasury et al 2004). This was accompanied by the introduction 
of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) between central and local government, which are 
intended to focus central/local government interactions on outcomes and enhanced 
performance information, by bringing together funding streams. GOs have been made 
responsible for negotiating and monitoring these agreements, which has intensified their 
engagement with localities. In 2003 GOs, alongside the RDAs and Assemblies, were also 
invited to prepare Regional Emphasis Documents, indicating how government spending 
and interventions might be refocused to increase their respective impacts against 
objectives for economic growth and social and environmental sustainability in each 
region (HM Treasury 2003). The purpose was to provide for greater flexibility and 
differentiation between regions, which would feed into departmental and local authority 
financial settlements (HM Treasury 2004). The 2004 Spending Review contained a 
further commitment to integrate regional decision making and in July 2005 a framework 
of indicative long-term regional funding allocations was published, covering economic 
development, housing and transport, within which stakeholders in each region are 
expected to prepare annual advice to ministers on regional priorities (HM Treasury et al 
2005).  
In March 2006 the Government published a Review of Government Offices, alongside the 
annual Budget Report (HM Treasury and ODPM 2006). It endorsed the added value that 
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GOs bring in helping departments to understand how best to apply national policies 
regionally and locally, assisting regional and local partners to maximise the effectiveness 
of policies and investment and exploit synergies, challenging partners to work together, 
removing obstacles to implementation, advising Ministers and speaking for central 
government departments in the regions. Nonetheless, it argued that because they have 
evolved in a largely uncoordinated fashion, which is reflected in substantial variability 
in the quality of performance across the GO network, measures were required to 
streamline the GOs’ activities to enable them to play a stronger role in supporting local 
and regional delivery and promoting flexibility. The Review set out a new set of 
strategic tasks for the GOs. First, rather than administering specific programmes 
themselves, GOs should work with regional and local partners, help set strategic 
objectives and priorities and monitor performance against these. Second, they should 
play a key role in advising departments on the opportunities and risks in taking forward 
the devolved decision-making agenda and, in return, be granted greater freedoms and 
flexibilities over national policies designed to impact on specific localities. Third, GOs 
should support and challenge those bodies responsible for developing regional 
strategies, help improve the quality and consistency of regional strategies and ensure 
that departmental approaches take account of these strategies. Taken together, it is 
asserted that refocusing the GOs’ activities should lead to significant opportunities for 
efficiency, rationalisation and reducing duplication and an overall decrease in GO staff 
numbers of a third by 2008. The objective is a more tightly focused, strategic and 
analytical role for the GOs, including a higher proportion of staff with policy and 
operational expertise, which will facilitate the further decentralization of government 
activity. 
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ROLES, STRUCTURES AND RESOURCES  
Roles 
Government Offices are formally responsible ‘for implementing and delivering at a 
regional level, administering programme resources provided by departments and 
administration resources, giving feedback on the effectiveness of departmental 
programmes and initiatives, linking departmental policies and providing a regional 
input to policy formulation’ (ODPM 2004a, p. 14). More specifically, they contribute to 
the delivery of Whitehall’s PSA targets. This task is not new; when first established GOs 
were charged with meeting targets relating to three themes; economy, regeneration and 
sustainability. Nonetheless, the number of targets has increased significantly. ‘The 
challenge for GOs is to adjust these ‘top-down’ targets to reflect regional circumstances 
and allocate resources to areas of activity, or localities, where most value can be added 
(North East GO official). Beyond the confines of the GOs, the regional tier has also 
emerged as a venue for the preparation of a proliferation of strategies, often promoted 
by Whitehall departments and, because GOs are expected to exert some influence over 
both strategies and the activities that flow from them, they are under constant pressures 
to examine their internal capabilities and benchmark themselves against others. 
One of the consequences of more departments being represented in GOs is the 
presumption that the Offices should also extend their involvement with sub-regional 
bodies, especially local authorities, on an increasing range of issues, including advising 
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them on emerging government policy, negotiating Local Area Agreements, which are 
intended to confer greater freedom on authorities to develop their own solutions to 
problems (ODPM 2004b) and supporting poorly performing authorities. GOs also have a 
duty to promote Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) across England to provide an 
umbrella for a variety of partnership structures and bring together different elements of 
the public, private, community and voluntary sectors (DETR 2001). The aim is to join up 
the activities of authorities and their partners in ways that complement national, 
regional and local objectives. Nonetheless, the presence of large numbers of local 
authorities in some regions and the density of partnership structures raises questions 
about the GOs’ capacity to engage consistently.  
Such pressures reflect wider concerns that the GOs’ human resources are being stretched 
by constant demands to adapt to evolving Whitehall agendas, demonstrate their added 
value to sponsor departments and respond to reductions in administration budgets. 
Assembly and RDA chief executives confirmed these often competing requirements 
which, alongside high levels of staff turnover in some GOs, were cited as obstacles to 
developing effective long-term partnerships. Moreover, the shift towards a more 
strategic focus is already intensifying demands for more GO senior staff with well 
developed negotiating, networking and analytical skills. 
Structures  
Some 350-450 civil servants work in each GO, headed by a Regional Director who is 
accountable to the RCU’s Director General. An RCU policy and management board, 
chaired by the Director General, regularly brings together GO Regional Directors, 
ministers and senior officials. There are also other high level Whitehall groups 
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overseeing the GOs, notably a steering group representing departments with a physical 
presence and financial stake in their activities. Within each region the GOs’ strategic 
leadership is provided by small management boards, comprising external, non-
executive directors and directors responsible for internal management and those policy 
functions which require a regional interface, including competitiveness, housing and 
environment issues. 
Most GOs are structured around directorates, based on policy themes. However, 
administrative structures have evolved in response to a growing stress on performance 
management, increasing complexity and competing views about roles. In London, for 
example, the GO manages the relationship between Whitehall and the Greater London 
Authority, while GOs in the rest of England have come under increasing pressure to 
establish closer working relationships with regional and local stakeholders. The 
outcome, first adopted by the South East GO, often regarded as England’s least cohesive 
region, and subsequently rolled out in varying forms in other regions, has been a 
‘matrix’ administrative structure, with teams combining functional responsibilities with 
a focus on place. Regarded initially as a radical step in Whitehall, the focus on 
geographical areas is an acknowledgement that local government administrative 
boundaries have lost much of their significance in terms of the spatial patterns of public 
service provision and private investment. Regional economic, housing and spatial 
strategies also incorporate a sub-regional dimension and partnerships across local 
authority boundaries have become embedded in all regions. The recent GO Review also 
stressed that GO activity needs to be significantly more focused around regional and 
local strategies rather than departmental boundaries; indeed, the intention is to increase 
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the proportion of GO staff working in ‘place-based’ teams from the current 5% to 
around 40% by 2008 (HM Treasury and ODPM 2006). The linking of GO responsibilities 
for thematic issues with a geographic overlay is clearly perceived as a way of breaking 
down departmental boundaries, responding more effectively to the needs of localities, 
encouraging partnership working and raising staff awareness of their contribution to the 
GOs’ wider remit. Nonetheless, the experience of GO teams indicates that efforts to 
increase their links with regional and sub-regional bodies are often crowded out by the 
growth in thematic activity from sponsor departments and the need to maintain internal 
communication across different national policy agendas.  
Financial resources 
GO annual reports indicate the level of expenditure ‘directly managed’ or ‘influenced’. 
However, no common template is applied. A 2003-04 report for one GO excluded RDA 
expenditure on the grounds that, while GOs are responsible for the mechanics of 
transferring funds to RDAs and submitting reports to the DTI on their performance, the 
Agencies are accountable to ministers. EU expenditure is also documented variously, 
while smaller expenditure packages are not always recorded because, although 
administered by GOs, payments are made directly from Whitehall. With these caveats in 
mind it is estimated that GOs were responsible for managing or influencing some 
£9.2billion of expenditure during 2003-04 (Table 1). Three sources accounted for 80% of 
expenditure, Department for Transport (DfT) (34%), ODPM (27%) and DTI (19%), while 
EU structural assistance made up 12%. The DfES, Home Office and DEFRA, together, 
contributed less than 9%; these departments have only recently collocated in the GOs 
and their expenditure impacts have been limited. DfT funding is directed, apart from 
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London, to local authorities for the implementation of local transport plans. The bulk of 
ODPM expenditure is for housing, which is channelled through local authorities and 
housing associations in accordance with Regional Housing Strategies. DTI funding is 
almost entirely accounted for by the department’s sponsorship of RDAs. DfES 
expenditure is chiefly associated with the funding of advice and guidance for young 
people, Home Office initiatives focus on local crime and drug reduction programmes, 
while DEFRA funding is chiefly associated with delivering the department’s Rural 
Strategy.    
On average each GO has annual expenditure of some £1billion, but this conceals wide 
differences. These reflect disparities in regional populations but, more significant, are 
the variations in social and economic circumstances and administrative structures. GOs 
for the South West (£483million) and East Midlands (£552million) had the smallest 
expenditures during 2003-04, reflecting the relatively low level of ODPM expenditure in 
these two regions, while the North West GO’s annual budget was £1.5billion. The GO 
for London accounted for nearly a third of all GO expenditure (£2.7billion), of which the 
majority was grant given to the GLA and its functional bodies, especially Transport for 
London (TfL) and the London Development Agency (LDA). Government grants for TfL, 
alone, accounted for almost £1.7billion, which underlines not only the capital’s unique 
transport problems, but also the differences in the administration of transport in London 
and the other English regions. While the unelected Assemblies have taken the lead in 
preparing regional transport strategies, unlike Greater London, there is no single body 
in the other English regions charged with anchoring the current, confused pattern of 
responsibilities for transport (Ayres and Pearce 2004).  
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Given these different funding arrangements it might be anticipated that London’s 
elected bodies would have substantially greater influence over budgets. Pimlott and Rao 
(2002) suggest that the GLA has interpreted its strategic and enabling powers 
generously to exploit the boundaries of its formal remit while, more recently, Margetts 
and Dunleavy (2005) report on public perceptions indicating that the GLA has delivered 
tangible policy improvements, notably in transport and policing. This can be attributed 
to London possessing a Mayor as an unequivocal leader. But, “rather more is due to the 
agreement among Londoners that ‘London’ is a coherent community with a general 
interest which needs to be addressed through its own institutions of government. It is 
that sense of general interest that the other English regions lack” (Economic and Social 
Research Council 2006, p. 3). Nonetheless, although roles are evolving, responsibility for 
service provision in London is in the hands of local authorities and implementation 
agencies over which government ministers have retained considerable powers and lines 
of accountability remain blurred. Unlike other English RDAs, for example, the LDA is 
formally answerable to the London Mayor rather than the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry but, like the other regions, its activities are entirely funded through the GO 
from central government.  
GOVERNMENT OFFICE RELATIONS WITH WHITEHALL  
According to many GO officials, especially outside south east England, Whitehall’s 
understanding of the GOs’ remit reflects a wider cultural problem in which government 
is seen to be entrenched in London (Lyons 2004). This is perceived to have a corrosive 
impact on policies and priorities, especially tackling regional economic inequalities 
(House of Commons 2003). The ODPM’s sponsored £100 million ‘Northern Way’ growth 
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fund, for example, aims to support investment priorities in the eight city regions in 
northern England. However, this is dwarfed by the Sustainable Communities Plan, 
which directs the bulk of national resources for urban development to the South East 
(Northern Way Steering Group 2004; ODPM 2003).    
Doubtless, some of the anxieties expressed by GO officials reflect the views prevalent in 
any ‘branch office’ about lack of autonomy, but many of the issues facing GOs are seen 
to originate from Whitehall’s suspicions about the notion of a dispersed civil service. A 
GO Regional Director stated, ‘I’m very conscious that Whitehall doesn’t always perceive 
us favourably’, while a DfES official reflected,  
‘When you talk about the GOs there’s the reality and the theory. GOs are supposed 
to work closely with government departments and influence them in the way they 
develop policy and give it a practical angle in terms of what will and won’t work. In 
reality it hasn’t worked quite in that way. Generally speaking GOs, for this 
department and other parts of Whitehall, have limited impact’. 
Officials in the regions view departments as still operating in silos with separate sets of 
targets which, when cascaded, give rise to considerable problems of co-ordination 
(Flinders 2002). Government rhetoric might stress partnership, synergy and 
coordination, but interviews with senior Treasury officials responsible for regional 
issues revealed limited awareness of the GOs’ strategy coordination role or the regional 
expenditure impacts of public sector policies (Mawson and Snape 2004). Moreover, 
although contacts between Whitehall and GO officials may have increased, engagement 
has focused on department-specific policies and GOs face constant demands from 
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sponsor departments for reassurance that ‘their’ interests are being represented, ‘their’ 
targets met and ‘their’ money is being well managed by ‘their’ teams.  
All regions are seeking to establish a ‘high level vision’, against which new or revised 
strategies can be tested. Strategy co-ordination is hampered, however, by a lack of 
understanding within Whitehall about the need to work to complementary objectives 
and a scarcity of data relating to economic conditions and public expenditure within 
regions (Allsop 2004; McLean 2003). Efforts to align the proliferation of regional 
strategies have so far proved challenging, in part because the activities of departments 
are not themselves joined up. ‘Still the centre demands different regional strategies with 
different approaches, which doesn’t help. Some are statutory, they’re on different time 
scales and each department wants its own strategy’ (GO official). While efforts have 
been made to ensure some correspondence between regional economic and spatial 
strategies and regional sustainable development frameworks, other strategies have been 
prepared in isolation, leading to contradictions and important topics being ignored.  
Performance measurement and management have become almost universal in 
government and increasing stress has been placed on PSA targets (James 2004). Their 
impacts, however, are disputed. Several senior GO officials judged that PSAs have 
compelled senior Whitehall managers to establish greater clarity about the GOs’ remit. 
Conversely, alongside RDA officials, others were critical of PSA targets for being too 
numerous, too often rooted in a silo mentality and for failing to take account of 
geographical variations. “Their current structure does not aid an understanding of, or 
clear vision of the targets in terms of the link between Ministerial initiatives and local 
need and delivery by place. There is no ‘line of sight’” (Government Office for the West 
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Midlands et al 2004, p. 3). Indeed, it was widely held that a more nuanced approach was 
required and there were calls among GO officials for them to be granted extended 
flexibilities over the use of their own budgets and greater influence over mainstream 
resources administered by both region-based NDPBs and local authorities. There are 
signs that these concerns have been heeded and the recent GO Review states that, rather 
than simply administering nationally designed schemes, the relationship between GOs 
and Whitehall should be governed by a ‘stronger accountability to departments around 
a small number of longer term agreed outcomes and increased flexibility for the GOs’ 
(HM Treasury and ODPM 2006, p. 23). 
The uneven support for regionalization amongst Whitehall departments has also 
restricted the GOs’ effectiveness. The Treasury’s increased contacts with GOs are 
regarded as especially significant, the department being viewed as ‘a valued ally’ by GO 
staff. Conversely, despite proposals to extend the number of DfES initiatives delivered 
through the GOs, the department was regarded as centralist, ‘as running their own ship, 
always thinking they can do it better under their own control’ (GO official). Similarly, 
the DfT was pronounced to be slowly developing its regional capacity, although 
responsibilities for delivering regional transport strategies remain fragmented. GO 
officials depicted the Home Office as ‘a late convert’ and, though well intentioned, was 
criticised for offering the least regional discretion among Whitehall departments and the 
complexity of its funding streams. Moreover, while DEFRA may be discarding its 
‘centralizing’ legacy, efforts by GO teams to coordinate policies for rural areas are 
frustrated  by ambiguities about institutional responsibilities for rural policy making 
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and delivery and a multiplicity of strategies, programmes and inflexible funding 
regimes (Pearce et al, 2005).  
The Regional Coordination Unit is intended to facilitate links between GOs and the 
centre and encourage departments to examine the regional impacts of their activities.  
Distinct differences of opinion emerged, however, among both GO and Whitehall 
officials about the Unit’s effectiveness. Like other structures aimed at improving the 
government’s ability to address strategic, cross-cutting issues, the RCU faces 
considerable problems in encouraging inter-departmental working around regional 
issues. Moreover, with only forty or so professional staff, all based in London and drawn 
from a range of Whitehall departments, the Unit’s capacity to combine the tasks of 
assessing the potential impacts of government policy at the regional level with 
managing and representing the GOs is problematic. Furthermore, from a GO 
perspective, the RCU’s location in the ODPM, rather than as a cross-Whitehall Unit 
based in the Cabinet Office or Treasury, can be seen to hamper efforts to embed regional 
issues in inter-departmental policy debates. Despite these shortcomings, some GO 
officials believed that progress was being made, ‘Increasingly the RCU is doing a better 
job in Whitehall and helps us get a voice in policy making. (GO East Official). By 
contrast, others underlined the importance of maintaining the GOs’ direct, bilateral 
relationships with individual Whitehall departments. 
An additional channel for GOs to seek influence in Whitehall is the ‘twinning system’ by 
which individual GO Regional Directors take the lead in lobbying departments on 
selected issues of common interest (Spencer and Mawson 2000). Joint approaches to 
Whitehall are commonly regarded, however, as resource intensive and requiring 
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judicious management. Moreover, ‘the GOs’ focus on operational delivery, 
predominantly junior staff mix and their departmental structure means that 
opportunities are missed for senior external engagement across boundaries’ (HM 
Treasury and ODPM 2006, p. 9). Some Whitehall officials censured GO managers for 
their lack of knowledge and understanding of Whitehall structures and national policies, 
while GO officials were critical of mechanisms for feeding views into and maintaining 
contacts in Whitehall. A GO Regional Director remarked, ‘The problem is that it’s 
informal and once the person moves on, which is normal in the civil service, you haven’t 
a clue what’s going to happen’. 
GOVERNMENT OFFICE RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
AGENCIES AND ASSEMBLIES 
Given the accumulation of activities in the regions, shared experiences, proximity and 
interdependencies, the relationship between GOs, RDAs and Assemblies should be one 
of partnership and co-operative working (Regional Co-ordination Unit 2003). 
Collaboration is judged essential in managing the complexities of regional working and 
securing consistency between regional strategies and considerable efforts have been 
made to foster high level dialogues between key agencies.  
Regional Development Agencies 
Formally, GOs work with RDAs on a range of regional issues and are responsible for the 
mechanics of paying the Agencies and reporting to the DTI on their performance. GOs, 
therefore, perform a dual function and, not unexpectedly, RDA officials affirmed that 
GOs should relinquish their ‘policing’ role in favour of a more collaborative type of 
relationship, geared less to short-term targets dictated by departments. Nonetheless, as a 
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DTI official observed, ‘We’ve positioned the GOs in a monitoring role, which has helped 
give them a clear function. There was a time when the RDAs would try and bypass GOs 
to Whitehall’. This attempt to clarify roles has not, however, precluded the national 
network of RDA chairs and chief executives from exploiting their well established routes 
into Whitehall.  
“People talk about them [GOs] as being the eyes and ears and the voice of 
government; the ‘embassy’ function. On the other hand, given the way the UK works 
and the nature of the connections already in place, you go to the organ grinder rather 
than the monkey. Understandably GOs can feel marginalised in this process” (RDA 
official).  
Furthermore, because of their inability to act outside Whitehall’s ‘commands’, RDA 
senior officials regarded the GOs’ capacity to join-up the delivery of government policy 
and programmes at the regional level with scepticism, especially their ability to co-
ordinate the activities of NDPBs. ‘They [GOs] don’t have a role as such to co-ordinate 
strategies. That responsibility falls on all three regional partners’ (East of England RDA 
official). 
Regional Assemblies 
Assemblies are intended to provide a focal point for their regions, speak on behalf of 
regional interests and work with a variety of public, private and voluntary sector 
partners. Nonetheless, GO officials accepted that outside London a lack of powers and 
fragmented territorial interests constrain Assemblies from formulating and championing 
regional views. They also acknowledged that regions possess unique socio-economic 
and political legacies, institutional traditions and styles of leadership which have shaped 
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inter-organizational relationships and the effectiveness of regional working. West 
Midlands GO staff, for example, highlighted the significance of long-established 
regional partnership working in facilitating good working relationships with the 
Assembly. By contrast, in the North East and North West, GO officials signalled that 
Assemblies had diverted too much energy into lobbying for elected status, rather than 
focussing on the more prosaic tasks of policy development and improving governance 
structures. On the other hand, a South West GO official drew attention to the lack of a 
cohesive governing class in the region, which had impeded efforts to establish long-term 
relationships and agreement on priorities. Similarly, in the South East, although market 
forces are a powerful inducement for local authorities to collaborate to achieve the 
infrastructure necessary to ensure the success of the regional economy, there is limited 
pan-regional cohesion among elites, which tend to have a fragmented, local focus and 
are suspicious about extending the roles of the regional institutions (John et al 2002).  
Evidence of tensions between GOs and Assemblies is reflected in the views of Assembly 
staff who reproached GO officials for their inability to frame advice without reference to 
Whitehall. Difficulties have also have arisen from seeking to reconcile the GO’s role in 
chairing Regional Boards with the Assemblies’ function to coordinate the proliferation of 
regional strategies. According to GO and RCU officials these ambiguities, which arose 
from the English Regions White Paper, had been intentional.  
‘It was deliberately written to allow local flexibility, but when it talks about the 
coordination of regional strategies it actually allocates that responsibility to both 
GOs and Assemblies. When we saw the draft we wondered if we should ask for 
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greater clarity, but we decided not to as we wanted to encourage local flexibility and 
it’s worked’ (GO Regional Director).  
In some quarters, however, it was gauged that the approach had purposely been 
designed to enable the centre to ‘divide and rule’. At best it had created uncertainty; as a 
South West Regional Assembly official conceded,  
‘We’ve agreed that the GO will be responsible for co-ordination through the 
Regional Board and that we will assess the alignment of regional strategies. It 
sounds easy but requires a lot of trust and partnership. We’re currently working 
through this and a lot depends on personalities.’  
Furthermore, although strategy coordination has clearly become an increasingly 
significant part of the motivations and activities of Assemblies, including the 
preparation of Integrated Regional Strategies and Frameworks, which have potential 
direct and indirect implications for public expenditure in the regions, significantly 
Treasury officials responsible for regional policy remain largely unaware of these 
activities (Mawson 2006).  
GOVERNMENT OFFICE RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT BODIES IN 
THE REGIONS 
Alongside the GOs, RDAs and Assemblies is a thick, but disjointed, layer of NDPBs with 
offices in the regions, the outcome of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s aimed at 
‘unbundling’ government through the creation of predominantly single purpose, quasi-
autonomous bodies (Pollitt and Talbot 2004; Skelcher 2000). Their presence has 
prompted debate not only about their legitimacy and accountability, but also how best 
to secure a degree of alignment between their activities. In responding to these concerns 
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all GOs have made progress in establishing Regional Boards to encourage greater 
communication between NDPBs, identify mutual aims and resolve inconsistency and 
duplication. Nevertheless, GO Regional Directors have approached the process in 
different ways with some adopting a ‘light touch’, while others have sought a more 
active role for the Boards. Following work on an IRS for the Eastern region, for example, 
a Regional Strategy Board, chaired by the GO Regional Director and including senior 
officials from the troika and other key agencies with a statutory remit, was established in 
2005 to oversee the preparation of individual regional strategies and their coordination 
and to have a direct oversight over key delivery mechanisms and agencies (Snape et al 
2005).   
‘We need to work to identify the strings between regional bodies and the centre 
because there may be issues that we have no influence over. So it’s about managing 
regional administrative structures in more effective ways, getting policy alignment 
and using this to influence Whitehall’ (Eastern GO official). 
Whitehall and GO staff were generally circumspect, however, about the Boards’ capacity 
to mobilise NDPBs to take greater account of regional priorities. At best they represent a 
first step towards collaboration and an opportunity to debate regional issues, exchange 
information and develop personal contacts. At worst they were little more than ‘talking 
shops’. Strategy alignment is hampered by the quasi autonomy of NDPBs, which ‘are 
less likely to engage with or remain in arrangements which reduce their capacity to 
manage resources in a way which delivers the outcomes required by their parent 
departments’ (Stewart 2005, p. 2). As a RDA chief executive astutely observed,  
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‘The most useful thing the GO can do is not the formal but the informal work behind 
the scenes, pushing things forward and resolving disagreements. They can’t 
reconcile the irreconcilable but they have developed enough trust for people to want 
to try’. 
The recent publication of guidance on indicative, longer-term, regional funding 
allocations for economic development, housing and transport, within which regional 
stakeholders are expected to prepare advice to ministers on regional priorities marks, 
however, a potential step change in efforts to secure greater coordinating between the 
activities of key regional bodies.    
‘These indicative allocations are intended to enable regions to better align their 
strategies and provide an enhanced input into Government policy development and 
public spending decisions that affect the regions’ (HM Treasury et al 2005, p.1). 
The guidance signals the Government’s determination to extend its devolved approach 
and opens up the prospect of vireing funds both geographically and between budget 
headings. GOs are required to facilitate the process and there are already signs that it 
could stimulate a more formal set of arrangements between GOs and other key regional 
bodies to examine and influence the pattern of public expenditure within regions 
(English Regions Network 2005). From the perspective of the regions, integration 
aligned to clear regional priorities could provide a potential boost in regional influence 
at the centre which, over time, could lead to ‘devolved budgets’ in other policy areas. 
Nonetheless, these developments depend crucially on the ability of regions to formulate 
robust and defensible advice to Whitehall on regional priorities and, for the present, it is 
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questionable whether the progress made in developing Integrated Regional Strategies 
and Frameworks is sufficient to meet Treasury requirements (Snape et al 2005).    
Besides working with regional bodies, GOs have been given the lead role in negotiating 
budgets and agreeing outcome targets, as part of an evolving system of Local Area 
Agreements (LAAs), drawn up between local authorities and central government, which 
are intended to give greater local autonomy over how money is spent. GOs are expected 
to focus on the ‘better outcomes to be achieved, rather than the means of doing so’ and 
play ‘a challenge role in relation to local authorities and their partners, benchmarking 
results from across them and providing analysis for authorities and departments on 
what works’ (ODPM 2004b, p. 11). GOs are also involved in supporting ‘Local Strategic 
Partnerships’, which bring together elements of the public, private, voluntary and 
community sectors to prepare and implement community strategies for their areas and, 
where appropriate, develop local neighbourhood renewal strategies.   
Sub-regional partnerships have also been established, comprising networks of 
organisations, often sponsored by RDAs, that advise RDAs and other key regional 
bodies on sub-regional priorities and opportunities. A measure of the importance 
attached to sub-regional working is the Government’s current interest in ‘City-regions’. 
They comprise partnerships between local authorities serving the major urban areas and 
are expected to provide a framework for networking and policy coordination, champion 
their areas’ interests, adopt city-region wide versions of LAAs and may acquire powers 
relating to transport, planning and housing (New Local Government Network 2005). 
The outcome of these ongoing developments is to place growing demands on GOs to 
develop a geographical dimension in their management structures and establish 
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regional relationship teams as single points of contact for regional and local partners and 
for GO senior staff to intensify their sub-regional links. GO Directors in the North West, 
for example, are seeking to establish ‘one-to-one’ relationships with each of the region’s 
forty-seven local authority chief executives and lead on LAA negotiations. This should 
enable GO staff to become more knowledgeable about local conditions, more sensitized 
to the implications of government policies for localities and better able to provide 
feedback to Whitehall on delivery issues. Nonetheless, there are variations in the 
capacities of local and sub-regional partnerships, which make a uniform GO response 
problematic. Moreover, while LSPs are viewed as a response to ‘partnership overload’, 
there is no suggestion that they should replace the existing multiplicity of partnerships 
(DETR 2001). There are also inherent tensions between the rhetoric surrounding the 
GOs’ respect for partnership working, in which local authorities and their partners are 
‘eager contributors’ and the GOs’ responsibilities for verifying local authority objectives 
and targets and monitoring their delivery. A recent evaluation of the first pilot LAAs 
observed, “[GOs] were not free to negotiate agreements on behalf of government 
without the need to ‘refer up’, and there were clearly different understandings about the 
extent of their devolved authority” (ODPM 2005a, p. 9). Similarly an examination of 
LSPs has confirmed uncertainties about the ways in which central departments and their 
agencies relate to local partnerships. GO engagement in LSPs has been variable and, 
beyond LSPs containing ‘Neighbourhood Renewal Areas’ where they have clear 
responsibilities for oversight, ‘GOs themselves point to the lack of resources to engage 
much with LSPs’ (ODPM 2005b, p. 33). Moreover, although LSPs rely on working 
through the GOs to build relationships with Whitehall delivery departments, local 
partners were critical of GOs for their limited influence in Whitehall beyond the ODPM. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
The failure of New Labour’s devolution plans leaves Greater London with the only form 
of regional government in England. Nonetheless, as this account shows, the Government 
is intent on boosting the regional tier through a process of ‘deconcentration’. As 
Whitehall’s key representatives in the regions, GOs are expected to be in the vanguard 
of this approach, which has been reflected in an expansion in their responsibilities on 
behalf of an increasing number of departments. Second, as regional ‘ring masters’, GOs 
have become involved in constructing new pathways to other units of regional and sub-
national governance, especially in negotiating LAAs. Third, in their role as regional 
‘champions’, GOs have led in providing regional inputs to the Spending Review 
Process, responding to Regional Indicative Budget Allocations and pursuing regional 
concerns in Whitehall. Fourth, GOs have begun to adapt their internal structures to 
assist in breaking down silos and working with places. Each of these activities is 
calculated to add value to the GOs’ activities and raise their profile in both Whitehall 
and the regions and the Government intends embedding these functions by giving the 
GOs a more strategic role.  
There are, however, several barriers to enhancing the GOs’ roles, which stem from the 
ambiguities surrounding Labour’s preference for developing regional structures 
alongside and, in part, overlapping established central-local policy, delivery and 
performance management relationships. They include the perception that regional 
institutions are an administrative convenience for the delivery of national policies rather 
than the management of territory, suspicions in parts of Whitehall’s about the need for a 
regional perspective, the lack of a clear assessment of the responsibilities of respective 
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government tiers and uncertainties about the GOs’ internal capabilities. While the ‘mood 
music’ may have changed it would be wrong to conclude that the drive towards a multi-
level, networked form of governance in the English regions has yet supplanted the 
Westminster-Whitehall model. In Whitehall there is little expectation that GOs should 
exert too much influence and, given the ways government accountability chains work, 
granting GOs greater discretion over policy design, budgets and delivery could lead to 
contradictions. Moreover, much regional expenditure is channelled through NDPBs, 
over which GOs have limited influence.  
Given the lack of a single regional body charged with coordinating the activities of 
multiple stakeholders, GOs have been urged to mobilise and participate in a multiplicity 
of partnerships as a way of resolving overlapping objectives, targets, delivery and 
management arrangements largely determined in Whitehall. But, while central 
government may stress subsidiarity, in which partners come together to develop 
solutions, this has yet to be matched by any significant influence over priority setting or 
budgets. The introduction of LAAs and indicative regional budgets could mark the 
beginnings of a shift in attitudes. Nonetheless, the risk is that, although GOs may work 
diligently to build partnerships and ‘join up’ policies and delivery, public bodies and 
their social and economic partners may become increasingly frustrated by ‘partnership 
overload’ and sceptical about their participation in governance structures that appear to 
have limited capacity for action. Furthermore, the GOs do not possess sufficient senior 
staff with the relationship building and negotiation skills necessary to cultivate 
partnership working. Indeed, if not handled sensitively, current plans to cut the number 
of GO staff by a third could unwittingly exacerbate this deficiency and replicate the 
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errors of the mid 1990s when staff reductions resulted in a loss of the GOs’ most 
experienced middle and senior managers (Mawson and Spencer 1997). 
GOs find themselves caught, therefore, between the Government’s desire for them to 
become both more strategic and innovative and, at the same time, take on more and 
more administrative tasks. This lack of clarity has constrained the GOs’ from realising 
their potential and the recent Review of Government Offices suggests that these 
shortcomings have been acknowledged. GOs are the only regional bodies which are able 
to provide an overall view of the way in which national, regional and local initiatives 
should be steered to fit together strategically; ‘Neither the RDAs nor the Regional 
Assemblies are yet sufficiently developed to take on such a role’ (Bache and Flinders 
2004, p. 104). Indeed, GOs are well placed to reduce fragmentation by securing policy 
alignment at regional level and supporting and engaging with sub-regional structures 
within the devolved decision-making framework. Even in London, where the Mayor’s 
strategic, enabling responsibilities are wide ranging and might be expected to overcome 
fragmentation, many of the Mayor’s strategies do not come with budgets or sanctions 
with which to enforce them and in many areas these are limited by powers retained by 
central government (Sandford 2005). Similarly, while City-regions are being canvassed 
as a channel to champion the interests of major urban areas and enable decision-making 
at a more strategic level, there is a perceived risk of  urban dominance and even their 
proponents acknowledge that City-regions ‘do not offer a substitute for comprehensive 
regional coordination’ (New Local Government Network 2005, p. 40).     
There is, therefore, a strong justification for building on the GOs’ capacities and the 2006 
GO Review signals that they should develop a more strategic approach to regional and 
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sub-regional working and acquire new freedoms and flexibilities over the use of national 
funding to deliver agreed outcomes. These reforms reflect the most that is politically 
achievable, but it is questionable whether they go far enough. A more radical step would 
be for GOs, in regions with or without elected regional assemblies, to become 
responsible for coordinating and implementing single regional programmes, comprising 
the majority of central government’s services delivered in the regions, including the 
regional activities of NDPBs (Town and Country Planning Association 2003). Against 
the background of regional strategies and priorities determined by regional and local 
institutions and stakeholders GO Regional Directors would chair ‘beefed-up’ regional 
strategy boards, comprising senior representatives from the troika and the 
Government’s key executive agencies operating in the regions; an approach already 
being pursued in some regions in response to the new regional indicative budget 
allocations. Indeed, GOs are uniquely placed to bridge the gap between the Treasury’s 
requirement that regional priorities be identified in accordance with indicative budgets 
and the Regional Assemblies’ work on RSSs and strategy coordination to determine 
proposals that reflect cross-cutting themes and which are tied to specific programmes 
and projects. Placing the GOs primus inter pares would also assist in reconciling the 
uncertainties surrounding the GOs’, Assemblies’ and RDAs’ roles in regional strategy 
coordination.  
Such a simplification would not only reduce fragmentation, GOs would also become 
better recognized as powerful centres of government activity in the regions and a single 
point of contact for stakeholders with central government. GO Regional Directors would 
also acquire a higher status akin to préfets, thereby exercising greater ‘regional voice’ and 
 33 
influence in Whitehall. As a consequence citizens would slowly become more aware of 
the powers and influences exercised at the regional level (Hazell 2006). Such far reaching 
reforms would challenge traditional roles and structures and granting GOs enhanced 
political clout would need to be accompanied by measures to increase their 
accountability and transparency to regional and local institutions. Nonetheless, the case 
for cultivating a more effective form of regional administration in England through the 
GOs remains persuasive.  
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Table 1: Expenditure (£million) managed or influenced by Government Offices, 2003-04 
 East 
Midlands 
Eastern North 
East 
North 
West 
South 
East 
South 
West 
West 
Midlands 
Yorks’  & 
Humber 
Offices 
outside 
London 
% London % All 
Offices  
% 
DfT 157.9 142.3 101.0 293.3 182.4 162.4 176.6 175.9 1391.8 22 1681.9 62 3073.7 34 
ODPM   91.8 220.0 260.2 544.5 254.6   71.3 343.2 169.8 1955.4 30 522.2 19 2477.6 27. 
DTI 113.9   82.9 223.5 295.0 124.1   94.6 256.4 266.5 1456.9 23 317.8 12 1774.7 19 
EU 134.1    53.81 146.3 252.9   43.3   94.6 120.4 183.4 1028.8 16    88.1 3 1116.9 12 
DfES   39.9   61.9  29.2   76.6   69.9   43.9   55.9   52.7  430.0 7    86.3 3   516.3 6 
Home Office   14.2   42.9   5.5    30.1   21.2   16.1   25.9   19.6  175.5 3   28.0 1   203.5 2 
DEFRA    0.2    0.9   <0.1    0.7   <0.1   <0.1    0.2   <0.1      2.0 <1   <0.1 <1      2.0 <1 
Totals 552.0 604.7 765.7 1493.1 695.5 482.9 978.6 867.9 6440.4 100 2724.3 100 9164.7 100 
% 6 7 8 16 7 5 11 9 70  30  100  
Population 2 4.2 5.4 2.6 6.9 8.0 4.9 5.3 5.0 42.3  7.3  49.6  
Spend per 
capita (£) 
131.4 120.0 294.5 216.4 86.9 98.6 184.6 173.6 152.3 
 
373.2  184.8  
Source: Government Offices for the Regions    
Notes:  
1 Eastern Region EU expenditure is the annual average over the programme period 2000-06.  
2 2001 populations (million)
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